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1. Introduction and motivation 
Worldwide trade in intermediate products was already identified in the early 1960’s as 
a key part of international trade (Balassa, 1966). Recent contributions have confirmed 
its increasing importance, specifically with respect to an important subset of 
intermediate gods: the parts and components of capital goods (Kimura et al., 2007; 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). A number of studies (a review is in the next 
section) potentially linked the trade in parts and components to the existence of global 
supply chains and adopted a gravity framework with a variety of trade determinants to 
analyze the phenomenon. In this paper we contribute to this literature in two ways. 
First, within a higher-dimensional incomplete-specialization Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework we build a theory-guided gravity model with supply-side country-specific 
characteristics to identify driving forces for trade in parts and components. Second, 
we test our model empirically by using a uniquely detailed and large data set of 
European trade in the parts and components of capital goods. In accordance with the 
predictions of our model, we provide evidence that trade in the parts and components 
of capital goods across Europe, i.e., between East and West Europe, is driven by 
supply-side country differences relative to the rest of the world, compatible with 
models of incomplete specialization and trade. We take our results as evidence for the 
existence of international East-West production networks in Europe, driven by trade-
offs between wages and coordination costs. 
The motivation for our paper comes from the simple idea of the specialization 
present at the intermediate step of production. We start with the notion of 
fragmentation that describes the deepening of the division of labor by horizontally or 
vertically splitting production processes into distinct tasks. A division of labor 
encourages specialization and fragmentation, thus further increasing incentives 
towards specialization. The realization of fragmentation-induced additional gains 
from specialization requires breaking up the spatial concentration of production that 
frequently happens on an international scale. Hence, firms specialize within the global 
supply chain, potentially by joining into international production networks or even by 
offshoring individual tasks. 
Apart from the potential gains, fragmentation-induced specialization implies 
costs of coordination beyond the level of a single firm or plant. Coordination costs 
typically entail costs of investment, the customization of products upon demand, 
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communication, and two-way trading of intermediate products. One would expect 
firms to join the global supply chain whenever fragmentation-induced specialization 
gains outweigh the implied coordination costs. Hence, the international scale of 
production networking should increase with fragmentation, with declining 
coordination costs, or with the strength of international incentives to specialize. 
On the country level, fragmentation-driven trade is reflected by vertical 
specialization. This happens when two or more countries provide value-added in the 
good’s production sequence with the key aspect of using imported intermediate inputs 
in producing goods that are again exported, i.e., the existence of the two-way trade of 
intermediate inputs (Hummels et al., 2001; Kimura et al., 2007).  
The most noticeable incidents of international production networks have so far 
been registered in East Asia (Kimura et al., 2007), as a consequence of fragmentation 
in the Japanese production of electrical machinery, leading to strong increases in two-
way trade in parts and components of electrical machinery between Japan and its 
neighbors (Kimura et al., 2008).1 When considering the evidence, one needs to keep 
in mind that fragmentation along with declining coordination costs represents 
technical progress2 that is produced in only a few industrialized economies (Keller, 
2004). Also, we observe poor-country firms specializing in tasks that tend to be 
routine, homogeneous, and intensive in labor, even in low-skill labor (Breda et al., 
2008; Kimura, 2006; Sinn, 2005). Case study evidence points to machine building and 
capital-goods production as the industries experiencing the most pronounced 
international production networking or even offshoring. 
From this description, one would expect supply-side country differences to 
play an effective role as in a factor-proportions setting. Specifically, across Europe 
one would expect firms in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that 
entered the EU in 2004 as new members (the EU-10) to specialize in labor-intensive 
tasks and firms in the old EU members (the EU-15) to specialize in capital-intensive 
tasks within the chain of production of capital goods. This allocation of tasks would 
generate two-way trade in the parts and components of capital goods across Europe. 
This process could be expected to be the most distinct during the European 
1 These phenomena are the most salient in electrical machinery, while intrasectoral input-output 
relationships across borders are weak in the transport equipment sector. In addition, the basic features 
of international fragmentation are detected in the chemical and material sectors (Kimura et al., 2008). 
2 This is in the spirit of the notion of capital-good variety describing an economy’s state of technology, 
as proposed in Romer (1990) and tested in Frensch and Gaucaite Wittich (2009). 
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convergence process and also supported by the commencement of that convergence 
process.3 European trade in parts and components will form a landscape to 
empirically test our model. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review of 
the conceptual background for analyzing fragmentation-induced trade in the parts and 
components of capital goods as a subset of intermediate goods and also earlier 
empirical results. In section 3, we motivate a gravity-equation model for parts and 
components trade, based on Haveman and Hummels (2004), to refine the approach 
taken in Kimura et al. (2007). We formulate our estimable specification and describe 
our data in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Hypotheses, empirical results, and a 
robustness analysis are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Current state of the conceptual and empirical background 
2.1 Overview of the relevant trade models 
In theoretical models, the potential determinants of specialization within the global 
supply chain include both comparative advantage and product differentiation together 
with economies of scale. Approaches associated with new trade theory model 
imperfect competition on the level of intermediate goods (Egger and Falkinger, 2006; 
Fujita and Thisse, 2006; Hayakawa, 2007). Economic geography models (Amiti, 
2005; Robert-Nicoud, 2008) aim at resolving the locations of component producers 
along with the trade-off between agglomeration tendencies and factor prices. Costinot 
et al. (2011) develop a theory of global supply chains with sequential production 
subject to mistakes, in which countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes 
specialize in later stages of production in a unique free-trade equilibrium. 
Most prominently, however, the rationalization of patterns of specialization 
and trade in intermediate products proceeds using traditional models of international 
trade, dating back to Jones and Kierzkowski (1990). These models explicitly assume 
the existence of the costs of coordinating international production with or without 
explicit reference to networks or offshoring. In particular, models of offshoring can be 
found to be grounded in Heckscher-Ohlin factor-proportions models of trade (Arndt, 
1997; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Deardorff, 2001; Egger, 2002; Egger and 
3 In an earlier stage of the integration of the EU-15 countries Chen and Novy (2011) show that during 
1999–2003 cross-country trade integration was lower for those countries that joined the EU most 
recently and that had not abolished physical border controls. 
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Falkinger, 2003), in extended-factor-proportions models of both trade and FDI 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996), and in specific-factor models (Kohler, 2004). 
Accordingly, international incentives for the specialization of tasks are given by 
country differences in terms of relative factor endowments or, absent factor price 
equalization, in terms of factor prices. This was proposed in Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), who identify individual tasks as prone to fragmentation and 
potential offshoring that may be part of the production processes of quite diverse 
products. From the point of view of capital-rich and/or skill-rich economies, this 
means that any routine task in any production can potentially be offshored. Assuming 
that firms are able to use their own technology whenever they opt to offshore parts of 
production and the cost of heterogeneity of offshoring across a continuum of tasks, 
Grossmann and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) demonstrate that the costs of offshoring 
versus wage differences drive the international division of the production chain.4  
Empirical evidence that looks at potential determinants of specialization 
within the international production chain is mixed. Analyzing a subset of offshore 
activities in terms of the U.S. inward processing trade with the EU,5 Görg (2000, p. 
418) concludes that “the distribution of fragmented production around the globe will 
be according to countries’ comparative advantages.” Exploring textile and apparel 
trade, however, Baldone et al. (2001, p. 102) find that “there is no evidence that the 
choice of the processing country by EU firms is due to pre-existing comparative 
advantages.” Egger and Egger (2003) broaden the scope of the analysis and show that 
important roles for Austrian offshoring to the CEE and the former Soviet Union was 
played by declining tariffs and unit labor costs in the two regions. Marin (2006) 
presents empirical evidence for the role of institutional influences on offshoring 
across Europe, based on Austrian and German firms’ survey data. Finally, Kimura et 
al. (2007) study East Asian versus European machinery parts and components trade 
within an augmented traditional gravity approach, where the absolute values of 
differences in per capita incomes between exporter and importer countries reflect 
4 This assumes that firm-level technologies open up the possibility for activities not related to 
offshoring to be done subject to technological differences across countries. Thus, there need not be 
factor-price equalization, but on the contrary, factor-price differences may exist to be exploited by 
offshoring activities.  
5 Inward processing imports are intermediate goods imports for further processing at home, after which 
goods are re-exported (as inward processing exports) under tariff exemption. Outward processing 
exports are intermediate goods exports to be further processed in a foreign country, after which goods 
are re-imported (as outward processing imports) under tariff exemption.  
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supply-side country differences. Finding positive coefficients for the absolute values 
of differences in per capita incomes for East Asian trade but negative ones for 
European trade, they—contrary to the previous literature—interpret their results as 
indicating evidence for the existence of international machinery production networks 
in East Asia, but not in Europe. The authors argue that European machinery parts and 
components trade is better explained by a horizontal product differentiation model. 
 
2.2 Augmented traditional gravity approach 
The search for evidence and determinants of activities within global supply chains 
employs the workhorse of the bilateral gravity framework. Models for analyzing 
potentially fragmentation-induced gross trade flows (processing trade, trade in parts 
and components, etc.) are usually set up to reflect likely determinants spelled out in 
competing theories with exporter and importer market sizes leading the pack. Then, 
supply-side country differences or similarities are supposed to catch factor-
proportions influences relevant from the perspective of comparative advantages 
versus new trade theory or economic geography influences. The differences or 
similarities are usually proxied by the absolute values of differences in per capita 
incomes or wages between exporter and importer countries. Finally, prior 
expectations on the coefficient for per capita income differences are formulated to 
discriminate between alternative trade theories: the existence of two-way trade driven 
by fragmentation within international production networks via comparative/location 
advantages is taken to imply a positive coefficient for the per capita income gap. The 
existence of horizontal intra-industry trade driven by new trade theories à la Krugman 
(1980) would imply a negative coefficient for the per capita income gap. 
Testing the influences of various trade theories against each other within the 
same gravity specification presupposes that these theories can be reduced to the same 
gravity specification. Factor proportions theories of trade are usually incomplete 
specialization models while new theories of trade yield a complete specialization in 
equilibrium. According to Haveman and Hummels (2004), due to the adding-up 
constraints of countries’ expenditure systems, for a world with more than two 
countries a combination of four assumptions suffice to derive the simplest possible 
bilateral gravity structure. These conditions are: (i) trade is only in final goods, (ii) all 
trade is frictionless and balanced, (iii) preferences over final goods are identical and 
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homothetic, and (iv) each good is produced in and exported out of only one country, 
independent of the details on the supply side that give rise to this complete 
specialization. Under these conditions, the volume of bilateral trade is described by a 
log-linear equation in both countries’ incomes and world income, and there is no 
scope for “augmenting” the gravity equation.  
New or new new theories of trade are based on product differentiation and 
monopolistic competition and give rise to complete specialization in equilibrium. 
Hence, according to these theories trade cannot be represented by gravity equations 
augmented by adding the absolute values of differences in per capita incomes 
(Arkolakis et al., 2012). Under complete specialization, analyzing gross trade flows is 
simply not informative about the specific driving forces connected to new trade 
theories or economic geography. This is true even when complete specialization is 
embedded into factor proportions theory as in Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
Therefore, any scope for augmenting the simplest gravity relationship requires that 
assumptions (i)–(iv) are violated. As shown in section 3, admitting trade in 
intermediate goods does not on its own (i.e., under the assumptions of full 
specialization, identical homothetic technology and frictionless trade) generate 
bilateral gravity equations augmented by supply-side country differences. Thus, 
negative coefficients for per capita income differences in augmented gravity equations 
describing potentially fragmentation-induced gross trade flows simply cannot indicate 
the presence of new trade theory influences on the data that would be rooted in 
complete specialization. In fact, as will follow from the analysis below, a gravity 
specification describing trade flows in parts and components as log-linear in both 
country sizes and absolute country income differentials does not describe the data 
well against any theoretical model of trade, i.e., it is mis-specified.  
 
3. A gravity model of trade in parts and components with incomplete 
specialization 
As outlined in section 2.1, parts and components are often modeled as differentiated 
products. However, much of the assumed differentiation may in fact be customization 
on demand within production networks or offshoring relationships (Antràs and 
Staiger, 2012). Levchenko (2007) demonstrates the compatibility of resulting lock-in 
problems with a Heckscher-Ohlin factor proportions approach to trade. From this 
point of view, different parts and components may be viewed as ex ante homogenous 
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across potential suppliers from potentially different source countries, and some parts 
and components may in equilibrium be produced in and be exported by more than one 
country. To let the data speak, we will analyze parts and components gross trade 
flows within an incomplete specialization Heckscher-Ohlin framework, allowing for 
complete specialization as a limiting case. Trade in intermediate goods will reflect the 
horizontal or vertical fragmentation of production. 
 
3.1 Multilateral trade with horizontal fragmentation: Assumptions 
We follow the literature by making two distinctions as a point of departure for 
deriving bilateral gravity equations (see especially Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and 
Keller, 2002; Haveman and Hummels, 2004). The distinctions are between complete 
versus incomplete specialization and between trade incentives versus trade costs. 
 A full theoretical derivation of bilateral gravity in the presence of trade costs is 
so far limited to complete specialization cases. In our incomplete specialization 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, we first have to answer how equilibrium can arise in the 
presence of trade costs in a Heckscher-Ohlin world economy comprised of j = 1,…,J 
countries with equal technologies, two factors of production (capital K and labor L), 
one final good, and many homogenous intermediate goods k = 1,…,N. With zero trade 
costs, destination-country customers are indifferent from where they source a 
particular homogenous good between all supplier countries, including their own 
country, resulting in random rationing à la Deardorff (1998). When trade costs vary 
by distance, one would expect that adding trade costs eliminates all but one supplier 
of this particular good to this particular country. However, any of the other suppliers 
may still be the minimum total cost supplier to other countries, given variations in 
distance between countries. So even if bilateral trade becomes completely specialized 
in the presence of trade costs, worldwide production does not need to be. General 
equilibrium specialization and trade is the outcome of total cost minimization as the 
sum of production and trade costs. In equilibrium there may be a minimum total cost 
supplier to a particular country that is not the minimum production cost supplier but is 
close in distance or the other way around. Also, we might have situations of equal 
minimum total cost suppliers, evoking a rationale for random rationing. Without 
specifying the technology of overcoming trade barriers, equilibrium diversification 
and trade are determined by a trade-off between factor endowment and trade cost 
influences. 
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While there is no higher dimensional Heckscher-Ohlin theory with trade costs 
upon which to rest our gravity derivation, this is how we look at it. Specifically, we 
put a multi-country, multi-product, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework into an 
intermediate goods trade extension of Haveman and Hummels’ (2004) description of 
incomplete specialization as our starting point. We argue that what we add in terms of 
trade cost structure upon the seamless world fits European realities: all countries are 
small and encircled by other equidistant small countries. Assuming an infinitesimally 
small border effect but no trade or any other service link costs implies that each 
customer country is indifferent among all potential supplier countries except itself,6 
motivating random rationing à la Deardorff (1998) to decompose countries’ 
multilateral gravity. Finally, adding specific effects in the econometric specification 
introduces the trade-off between incomplete-specialization forces and service-link 
costs into bilateral-gravity equations that is behind much of the theoretical motivation 
for the fragmentation-induced trade cited in section 2. In accordance with the above 
we make the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1 – technology. Production is horizontally fragmented in the spirit of 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where firm-specific production technologies 
are available in all countries. Hence, N tasks are carried out, using two factors of 
production (capital K and labor L), each of which results in a tradable intermediate 
good—a part or component. One final good is assembled from these N parts or 
components. All production is subject to homothetic derived demands. 
 
Assumption 2 – trade costs. We assume an infinitesimally small border effect, but no 
trade or any other coordination costs.  
 
Assumption 3 – trade balance. Imports of country i from country j (IMij) are equal to 
the exports of country j to country i (EXji), IMij = EXji. 
 
3.2 Multilateral gravity and incomplete specialization in the presence of trade costs 
According to Assumption 1, all production is subject to homothetic derived demands, 
such that all variables can be studied in nominal terms: C is consumption or use, X 
6 In terms of our empirical work (Section 5), this ensures that distance-related coordination costs are of 
second order compared to border effects. 
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production, Y income, EX exports, and IM imports. Subscripts denote countries, 
superscripts goods. Given the existence of N intermediate goods and neglecting 
primary inputs, parameters 𝛿𝑗𝑘 denote the allocation of value-added Z to the 
production of a part or component k in each country j over two stages of production. 
Then, 
    𝑍𝑗𝑘 = 𝑋𝑗𝑘 = 𝛿𝑗𝑘𝑌𝑗 for k = 1,..., N   (1) 
and  
 𝑍𝑗𝑁+1 = 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1 − ∑ 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 = 𝛿𝑗𝑁+1𝑌𝑗 ,   with  ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 + 𝛿𝑗𝑁+1 = 1  (2) 
such that 
   ∑ 𝑍𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑁+1 = 𝑌𝑗  .     (3) 
With Assumption 1 (homotheticity in production), parameters 𝜙 represent the 
productivity of parts and components, and describe the distribution of derived 
demands in nominal terms,  
    𝐶𝑗𝑘 = 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑁+1   for k = 1, ..., N. (4) 
With (2) and (3), the value-added in producing the final good can be written as                       𝑍𝑗𝑁+1 = 𝛿𝑗𝑁+1𝑌𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1 − ∑ 𝐶𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1 − 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1 ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1                                                     = 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1�1 − ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 �     (5) 
such that 
𝑋𝑗
𝑁+1 = 𝛿𝑗𝑁+1𝑌𝑗
1−∑ 𝜙𝑗
𝑘𝑁
𝑘=1
    .     (6) 
Equation (6) describes the output of the final good in country j. Demand is given by 
spending the total income on the final good, 𝐶𝑗𝑁+1 = 𝑌𝑗 . Accordingly, the net exports 
of the final good are described by  
𝑁𝐸𝑗
𝑁+1 = 𝑋𝑗𝑁+1 − 𝐶𝑗𝑁+1 =  𝛿𝑗𝑁+1𝑌𝑗1−∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 − 𝑌𝑗 = � 𝛿𝑗𝑁+11−∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 − 1� 𝑌𝑗.   (7) 
For parts and components, output is given in (1) and used in (4), which also holds for 
the world as a whole, 𝐶𝑤𝑘 = 𝜙𝑤𝑘𝑋𝑤𝑁+1. With final goods output as described in (6) we 
obtain 
𝐶𝑗
𝑘
𝐶𝑤
𝑘 = 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝜙𝑤𝑘 𝛿𝑗𝑁+1𝑌𝑗𝛿𝑤𝑁+1𝑌𝑤 1−∑ 𝜙𝑤𝑘𝑁𝑘=11−∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑁𝑘=1  , for k = 1,...,N.    (8) 
Expression (8) can be simplified using two characteristics of world trade. First, the 
world version of (7) implies that 1 −∑ 𝜙𝑤𝑘𝑁𝑘=1 = 𝛿𝑤𝑁+1, as world trade in final goods 
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must always be balanced. Second, world output of any good is always equal to world 
use, such that 
𝐶𝑗
𝑘 = 𝜙𝑗𝑘
𝜙𝑤𝑘
𝛿𝑗
𝑁+1𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤 1 − ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑘 𝑋𝑤𝑘  = 𝜙𝑗𝑘
𝜙𝑤𝑘
𝛿𝑗
𝑁+1𝑌𝑗
𝑌𝑤 1 − ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑘 𝛿𝑤𝑘𝑌𝑤 = 𝜙𝑗𝑘
𝜙𝑤𝑘
𝛿𝑗
𝑁+11 −∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑘 𝛿𝑤𝑘𝑌𝑗 . 
           (9) 
Country j’s net exports or imports of part or component k are described by  
                                     𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑘 = 𝑋𝑗𝑘 − 𝐶𝑗𝑘, for k = 1, …, N. (10) 
Hence, 
𝑁𝐸𝑗
𝑘 = 𝛿𝑗𝑘𝑌𝑗 −  𝜙𝑗𝑘𝜙𝑤𝑘 𝛿𝑗𝑁+11−∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑘 𝛿𝑤𝑘𝑌𝑗 = �𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝜙𝑤𝑘 𝛿𝑗𝑁+11−∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝑘 𝛿𝑤𝑘� 𝑌𝑗  . (11) 
As we are only interested in parts and components trade, we may simplify (11) by 
assuming balanced final goods trade for each single country,7 such that 
    𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑘 = (𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝜙𝑗𝑘𝜙𝑤𝑘 𝛿𝑤𝑘)𝑌𝑗,   for k = 1,…, N.    (12) 
On the basis of (12), countries export a specific part or component if they devote a 
greater share of the value-added to producing this good than the rest of the world 
(𝛿𝑗𝑘 > 𝛿𝑤𝑘 ), or if their part or component is more productive in terms of final output 
than the rest of the world (𝜙𝑗𝑘 < 𝜙𝑤𝑘 ). With Assumption 1 (firm-specific technologies 
are identically available everywhere in the world), we can further simplify (12) to 
      𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑘 = (𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝛿𝑤𝑘)𝑌𝑗, for k = 1, …, N. (13) 
Summing over all goods k, the net exports of the parts and components of country j to 
the world are 
      𝑁𝐸𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗 ∑ (𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝛿𝑤𝑘)𝑛𝑘=1  .   (14) 
7 Empirically, assuming balanced trade does not usually make a significant difference; see Helpman 
(1987).  
11 
 
                                            
Selecting export items into set KEXj, country j’s multilateral parts and components 
exports are 
𝐸𝑋𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗 ∑ (𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝛿𝑤𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾𝐸𝑋𝑗 .   (15) 
Analogously imports are defined as, 
    𝐼𝑀𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗 ∑ (𝛿𝑤𝑘 − 𝛿𝑗𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾𝐼𝑀𝑗 .    (16) 
By extending the descriptions of trade only in final goods in Haveman and Hummels 
(2004) to trade in parts and components in this way, equations (15) and (16) yield our 
first result. 
 
Result 1. A country’s multilateral exports (imports) of parts and components, 
generated by horizontal fragmentation, are log-linear in country income Y and a 
specialization pattern. A country’s specialization pattern is described as its deviation 
from the rest of the world in terms of the average value-added share of producing the 
parts and components in its export and import baskets, i.e., by ∑ (𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝛿𝑤𝑘)𝑘∈𝐾𝐸𝑋𝑗  and 
∑ �𝛿𝑤
𝑘 − 𝛿𝑗
𝑘�𝑘∈𝐾𝐼𝑀𝑗 , respectively. 
Exports and imports exhibit unitary elasticities with respect to the country income 
provided specialization patterns are uncorrelated with income. 
 
 As an intermediate step we proceed with the simple version of bilateral trade 
in parts and components with complete specialization, when each part or component 
is exclusively supplied by one country. Hence, good k imports of country i from the 
world are in fact the good k imports of country i from some country j. As country i 
uses all the parts and components supplied by country j, this decomposition of 
multilateral trade straightforwardly implies bilateral trade in parts and components 
with complete specialization as log-linear in both countries’ incomes.8  
 
3.3 Bilateral trade under incomplete specialization 
8 This is shown in Haveman and Hummels (2004) for trade in final goods. Chaney (2008) demonstrates 
that bilateral gravity continues to hold under conditions of complete specialization, even when not 
every good produced is traded.  
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In contrast to the simple complete specialization case, with incomplete specialization 
and no further cost of trade considered, it is not possible to strictly analytically 
decompose (15) and (16) into bilateral trade relationships. However, (15) and (16) 
together imply the two following results that represent conditions subject to which 
bilateral parts and components trade relationships will be distributed in a statistical 
sense in a sample of countries. 
 
Result 2. For bilateral trade to occur, countries’ specialization patterns as described in 
(15) and (16) must be complementary. Hence, there must be at least one k that is both 
exported by country j and imported by country i. 
 
Result 3. Equations (15) and (16) describe countries’ multilateral trade, i.e., the 
expected values of bilateral relationships. Thus, (15) and (16) can be expected to be 
met on the average in all bilateral trading relationships. 
 
Results 2 and 3 together already allow for qualitative predictions for bilateral 
trade relationships. First, larger countries trade more on average. Using Result 1, in a 
sample of heterogeneous countries, larger countries can indeed be expected to trade 
more with each other. Hence, the bilateral parts and components trade volume will 
increase with the product of trading countries’ incomes (Yj×Yi). Second, countries that 
are more specialized against the world average trade more on average. Thus, in a 
sample of heterogeneous countries, countries that are more specialized vis-à-vis the 
world can be expected to trade more parts and components with each other provided 
that their specialization is complementary. 
Combining our Result 1 with previous results from the literature allows us to 
derive the most important result of this section in the form of a bilateral-gravity 
framework constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns reflecting 
factor endowments or factor prices. 
 
Result 4. With incomplete specialization, bilateral trade in parts and components is 
log-linear in both countries’ incomes and their specific supply-side differences with 
respect to the world. Formally, 
𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑖 ∝ 𝑌𝑗𝑌𝑖�𝑤𝑗 − 𝑤𝑤 ��𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑖 �,    (17) 
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 where wj, wi, and ww represent countries’ and world-average supply-side 
characteristics either in the form of capital-labor or wage-rental ratios.  
 
The remainder of this section derives Result 4, by combining Result 1 with the 
previous literature to analyze the interaction between factor endowments/prices and 
border effects within a gravity framework viewing bilateral trade equations as 
statistical relationships constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns. 
In particular, we make use of Deardorff’s (1998) random choice argument, which in 
our context states that a country’s customers, due to small border effects, prefer their 
home part or component to foreign ones, but are indifferent between foreign-produced 
parts or components. Hence, good k imports of country i from country j are given by 
country i’s worldwide imports of k times country j’s share in worldwide exports of k. 
Formally, 
𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗
𝑘 = 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑘 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑘∑ 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑗 .       (18) 
Incentives driving countries’ bilateral trade under incomplete specialization 
must match our underlying Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Following the derivation of 
Result 1, consider again that worldwide exports of part or component k out of country 
j are given by 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑘 = 𝑌𝑗(𝛿𝑗𝑘 − 𝛿𝑤𝑘). We now interpret this multilateral gravity 
equation between country j and world w as a bilateral gravity equation between two 
countries j and w. Then, using the argument put forward in Evenett and Keller (2002, 
p. 286), in a 2×2×2 Heckscher-Ohlin world, if country j is relatively capital-rich and 
part or component k is capital intensive, value-added 𝛿𝑗𝑘 is positively related to 
country j’s capital-labor ratio κj = (K/L)j, and 𝛿𝑤𝑘  is inversely related to w’s capital-
labor ratio, κw = (K/L)w. Hence, the volume of trade increases in the difference 
between capital-labor ratios, (κj – κw), such that 
𝐸𝑋𝑗
𝑘 ∝ 𝑌𝑗(𝜅𝑗 − 𝜅𝑤 ).        (19) 
Analogously, we can write 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑘 ∝ 𝑌𝑖(𝜅𝑤 − 𝜅𝑖 ) for relatively labor-rich 
country i exporting the labor-intensive part or component and importing the capital-
intensive k. Accordingly, for any two countries j and i, capital-rich and labor-rich 
relative to the world w, respectively, 
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 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑘 ∝ 𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗�𝜅𝑗 − 𝜅𝑤 ��𝜅𝑤 − 𝜅𝑖 �      (20) 
as ∑ 𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑘𝑗  is given for each particular country. 
According to Ethier (1985), the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem carries through to 
the case of more than two goods, such that specialization patterns between countries j 
and w and countries w and i continue to be shaped by differences in capital-labor 
ratios, at least in terms of correlations. Deardorff (1979) shows that, in a two-country, 
two-factor model, trade in more than two goods accords with the ranking of goods by 
factor intensity if there are unequal factor prices, as long as there is no connection 
between trade in final goods and intermediate goods. Different factor prices should be 
the rule in our context due to infinitesimally small home country effects. As we have 
derived Result 1 on trade in parts and components without reference to trade in final 
goods, country j will export the more capital intensive parts and components if 
country j is capital-richer than country w and if its wage-rental ratio is higher than that 
in country w. Thus, the predictive power of 𝑌𝑗�𝜅𝑗 − 𝜅𝑤 � for exports from country j to 
country w continues to hold. We can, however, generalize that for exports from 
capital-rich country j to country w in fact 𝑌𝑗�𝑤𝑗 − 𝑤𝑤 � has predictive power, where 
wj and ww represent supply-side differences either in the form of capital-labor or 
wage-rental ratios. The analogous reasoning can be applied to labor-rich country i 
imports from w, so we can generalize proportionality (15) to the multi-product case, to 
describe total imports to labor-rich i from capital-rich j, with or without factor price 
equalization. Finally, according to Assumption 3 (IMij = EXji), equation (17), as stated 
in Result 4, indeed holds.  
 
4. Empirical specification 
4.1 General outline 
Combining our results from the previous section now allows us to specify a testable 
bilateral gravity equation. For any pair in a sample of heterogeneous countries we 
reformulate Result 4 in terms of absolute values. Hence, (17) directly translates into a 
log-linear relationship: 
              log  𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 log�𝑌𝑗 × 𝑌𝑖� + 𝛽2 log��𝑤𝑗 – 𝑤𝑤� × �𝑤𝑖 – 𝑤𝑤��. (21) 
15 
 
Specification (21) is a substantial two-fold extension of Haveman and 
Hummels’ (2004) approach towards formulating bilateral gravity equations in the 
presence of incomplete specialization as statistical relationships.9 First, we extend 
their approach to trade in intermediate goods; second, we succeed in identifying a 
particular form of the influence of Heckscher-Ohlin sources of specialization patterns 
on bilateral gravity equations for trade in parts and components. Equation (21) is easy 
to interpret. Assuming a sample of heterogeneous countries, bilateral trade volumes 
(EXji) will increase with the product of trading countries’ incomes (Yj×Yi) and with the 
countries’ degree of specialization against the world average. Specifically, bilateral 
trade volumes are expected to increase with the product of countries’ respective 
supply-side differences against the world, �𝑤𝑗 –  𝑤𝑤� × �𝑤𝑖 – 𝑤𝑤�. Hence, 
specification (21) captures the fact that bilateral trade flows will increase with 
relative, rather than absolute, supply-side country differences. 
However, the problem with the above formulation is the potential absence of 
complementary specialization in Result 3 above: relative supply-side country 
differences �𝑤𝑗  – 𝑤𝑤� × �𝑤𝑖 – 𝑤𝑤� predict large trade volumes also for countries that 
lack complementary specialization. We solve this problem by introducing dummy 
variables to account for bilateral parts and components trade relationships between 
countries that are expected to be characterized by complementary specialization. This 
assignment should be done based on a priori information about the values of the 
supply-side country differences, e.g., on the basis of wj > ww and wi < ww. Since our 
empirical analysis is performed on European trade data, we introduce a dummy 
variable DummyEU15/10 that equals one for trade relationships between an EU-15 
(old) and an EU-10 (new) country and zero otherwise. Specifically, within a panel of 
data on EU-25 countries, bilateral trade in parts and components (EX(PC)ji,t) can be 
described, so far without accounting for trade barriers, by the following specification: 
log𝐸𝑋(𝑃𝐶)𝑗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 log(𝑌𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑌𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� × �𝑤𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡�� + 
 +𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝐸𝑈15/10)𝑗𝑖 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� × �𝑤𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡��.  (22) 
9 Haveman and Hummels’ (2004) basis for their econometric specification of bilateral trade is log  𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 log�𝑌𝑗 × 𝑌𝑖� + 𝛽2 log��𝑤𝑗  –  𝑤𝑤� + 𝛽3�𝑤𝑖  –  𝑤𝑤��. I.e., larger countries can be 
expected to trade more with each other, controlling for their specialization patterns, which they ad hoc 
proxy by specialization sources in terms of partner countries’ capital-labor ratios, relative to world 
averages.    
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 4.2 Trade barriers and gravity specification for bilateral trade in parts and 
components with incomplete specialization 
Traditional gravity approaches explicitly cope with different trade barriers, i.e., 
distance (to proxy transport costs), geographic contiguity, cultural proximity, and the 
like. However, the relevant discussion on using gravity frameworks (Cheng and Wall, 
2005; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) recommends making use of the panel structure of 
available trade data. The specific purpose is to incorporate trade barriers under time-
invariant country-pair-specific as well as country-pair-invariant time-specific omitted 
variables to be controlled for by appropriate fixed effects. In terms of trade barriers, 
this procedure has the advantage over traditional procedures of also controlling for 
countries’ multilateral trade resistance (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). 
Hence, the procedure has the intuitively appealing notion that bilateral trade barriers 
should always be measured relative to the world, in a similar fashion as trade 
incentives in the form of supply-side country differences described above. An 
implication is that, given fixed trade barriers between countries j and i, then the higher 
the trade barriers of a country j with respect to the world, the more the country j will 
be driven to trade with country i. 
The estimable specification is rooted in our model described in section 3 and 
accounts for the issues raised in section 4.1. It takes the following simple form of a 
gravity model:  log  𝐸𝑋(𝑃𝐶)𝑗𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1 log�𝑌𝑗,𝑡 × 𝑌𝑖,𝑡� + 𝛽2 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� × �𝑤𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡�� + +∑ 𝛾𝑠𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝐸𝑈15/10)𝑗𝑖,𝑠 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� × �𝑤𝑖,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡��5𝑠=1 +  𝑐𝑗𝑖 + 𝑘𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡.           (23) 
Exogenous (to our model), technical progress through decreasing coordination 
costs and ongoing fragmentation can be represented by time effects. Nevertheless, our 
motivation of fragmentation and the trade it induces does not imply a high degree of 
substitutability but rather complementarity between technical progress and the 
possibility of using supply-side country differences. Hence, we model this by 
interacting the combined variable 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸𝑈15/10𝑗𝑖 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� ×
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�𝑤𝑖,𝑡 –  𝑤𝑤,𝑡�� with time-period effects. For this purpose, we divide the sample period 
(1992–2008) into five sub-periods of (almost) equal length.10 
 
4.3 Estimation strategy 
Specification (23) is estimated on unbalanced panel data with a mean time length of 
about 10 years. We proxy capital-labor ratios by GDP per capita and wage-rental 
ratios by wages, assuming much lower variation in interest rates than in wages across 
Europe.11 In specification (23) we use time-invariant asymmetric country-pair-
specific effects (cij) to capture the fixed effects between exporting and importing 
countries that do not change over time. In general, researchers prefer using a pairwise 
fixed effects model because the individual effects could be correlated with the 
explanatory variables; this potential correlation of the fixed effects and right-hand-
side variables can lead to inconsistent estimates, especially in a dynamic setting. 
Moreover, a pairwise fixed-effects model absorbs all time-invariant regressors that 
characterize the relationship between an exporter and importer. Further, pairwise 
fixed effects estimation has an advantage by eliminating potential omitted variable 
bias. Finally, by using a pairwise fixed-effects model we are able to account for the 
multilateral trade resistance issue broadly discussed in the literature.12  
In order to obtain consistent estimates we employ a dynamic panel-data model 
following the approaches of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell et al. (2000). The estimator is implemented 
in STATA 12 as an xtdpd command and it uses moment conditions in which the 
lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined variables serve as instruments for 
the differenced equation. We begin our estimation by performing a Hausman-type 
specification test to assess the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables by 
comparing a standard fixed effects model with the Arellano-Bond-Bover-Blundell 
technique. 
10 Navaretti and Venables (2004), among others, show that fragmentation is a necessary condition for 
countries starting to engage in production-process vertical division of labor to utilize the advantage of 
location differences. 
11 Amiti and Davis (2011) analyze the impact of trade liberalization on wages by accounting for firm-
level heterogeneity in trade behavior as well as the large and growing importance of trade in 
intermediate products. 
12 For details on the use of relative price differences dealing with multilateral trade resistance in 
gravity-type specifications see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Feenstra (2004) shows that 
including country-pair dummies generates about the same effect as using relative price differences. 
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As the test confirms the endogeneity of explanatory variables we proceed with 
instrumentation. We estimate the theoretically motivated specification (23) in a panel 
setting with fixed effects plus instrument variables a) to overcome the problems of 
omitting-variables bias and b) to control for time-invariant endogeneity and selection 
bias. This is done because some of the right-hand-side variables are correlated with 
the dependent variable. Specifically, let us note that GDP by standard identities 
contains corrections for international trade flows and therefore using a GDP measure, 
either in absolute values or scaled per-capita values, would create problems even in a 
panel setting. The reason is that, by construction, the unobserved panel-level effects 
are correlated with potentially endogenous independent variables that cause standard 
estimators to be inconsistent. Our estimation approach controls for the potential 
endogeneity of explanatory variables and performs well even with low-order moving 
average correlations in error terms or predetermined variables as in Blundell and 
Bond (1998). 
 
5. Data 
Bilateral trade in parts and components EX(PC)ji describes the exports of parts and 
components from country j to country i over the period 1992–2008. The data were 
compiled from the United Nations COMTRADE database. The definition of the parts 
and components of capital goods follows the BEC categorization of the UN Statistics. 
Our data cover 24 EU countries, which leads to 552 (23 x 24) importer-exporter 
country pairs.13 Our data do not contain zero-trade flows; hence, we do not need to 
apply the two-stage estimation procedure suggested in Helpman et al. (2008). The 
details on the data and variables used are provided in Tables 1 and B.1. 
In our estimation we employ three different measures of bilateral trade in parts 
and components. First, we measure the trade flows of how much country j exports to 
country i, which is identical to how much country i imports from country j. Then, 
following Frensch (2010), we measure bilateral trade along the extensive and 
intensive margins. Hence, our second measure, trade along the extensive margin, 
represents the variety of parts and components of capital goods exported from country 
j to country i at time t. It is defined as a count measure over some 300 parts and 
components out of all 3,114 of the SITC Rev.3 categories. Our third measure, along 
13 Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country. Cyprus and Malta are not included due to 
limited data. 
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the intensive margin, represents the intensity of parts and components exported from 
country j to country i at time t. The intensive margin is defined as the average 
volumes of exported parts and components categories. 
Further, Yj and Yi are exporter and importer GDP at current prices, 
respectively. Similarly we employ exporter and importer GDP per capita at current 
prices as an alternative measure of supply-side country differences. Both GDP-related 
data were obtained from the World Development Indicators (accessed via the DCI 
database). Our primary measure of supply-side country differences is wages in 
exporting (wj) and importing (wi) countries and they are measured as the annual wage 
average in the manufacturing sector of exporting (importing) country j (i) at a specific 
year t. For each country an average wage in the manufacturing sector in the local 
currency was converted into USD. The data were obtained from LABORSTA 
(International Labor Office statistical databases, http://laborsta.ilo.org/). 
World GDP per capita at current prices and world average wage (ww) is 
measured as the mean GDP per capita in the world and the mean wage in the world, 
respectively; the world is defined by our full reporting sample described in Appendix 
Table A.1. Analogous to a simple mean we also construct the weighted averages of 
world GDP per capita and wages in which population sizes (pi) serve as weights. 
Population data were obtained from World Development Indicators. With these 
variables we construct relative supply-side country differences in GDP per capita and 
wages, �𝑤𝑗 –  𝑤𝑤� × �𝑤𝑖 – 𝑤𝑤�. Given that specification (23) is rooted in factor-
proportion models of incomplete specialization and trade, existing wage differences 
may be subject to factor price equalization tendencies by the very trade they induce.14 
As factor-price differences may not be strictly exogenous, we follow Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and apply the simplest possible remedy in choosing the second lags of 
the explanatory variables as instruments. 
The time-specific effects in (23) also control for each year’s data using a 
different numéraire since GDP and trade values are all current (Baldwin and Taglioni, 
2006), where original USD-denominated data are converted to euros. 
 
6. Empirical Results  
6.1 A priori expectations and benchmark results 
14 Most of the fragmentation-induced offshoring literature is in fact on these labor market effects; see, 
e.g., Geishecker and Görg (2008). 
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Our key results are based on estimates from specification (23) that are explicitly 
rooted in incomplete specialization. Hence, we can form a priori expectations on 
some coefficients and formulate testable hypotheses. First, we state Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: The bilateral parts and components trade volume will increase with the 
product of trading countries’ incomes; formally we test whether β1 > 0. 
As equations (15) and (16) describe the expected values of bilateral trade 
relationships, we may even expect β1 to equal one, provided the extent of 
specialization is uncorrelated with income.  
Second, we state Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2: The volume of trade is related to the extent of supply-side country 
differences relative to the world. 
However, we cannot form an a priori expectation about the value of β2 without 
further information on the sample of countries. If the sample is heterogeneous in 
terms of complementary specialization, we expect β2 > 0. If the sample is sufficiently 
homogenous, with, say, all wi > ww, then there is no reason to assume the majority of 
country pairs to be complementarily specialized. In this case higher deviations of both 
countries’ specialization incentives from world averages, i.e., higher �𝑤𝑗 –  𝑤𝑤� ×
�𝑤𝑖 – 𝑤𝑤�, will generate less parts and components trade, such that β2 < 0. 
Third, if a complementary specialization can be derived from the data then the 
dummy variable DummyEU15/10 in specification (23) would capture the “right” 
country pairs with complementary specialization. For that case, we state Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: The volume of trade will increase with the extent of truly 
complementary specialization between countries; formally we test whether γs > 0. 
Since the interactive term 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐸𝑈15/10𝑗𝑖 log��𝑤𝑗,𝑡 – 𝑤𝑤,𝑡� ×
�𝑤𝑖,𝑡 –  𝑤𝑤,𝑡�� is estimated separately for five sub-periods over the period 1992–2008, 
we obtain five coefficients γs. This set of coefficients enables us to capture the 
dynamic effects. 
Finally, we state Hypothesis 4.  
Hypothesis 4: The volume of trade will increase with the degree of specialization 
between the new and old EU countries. 
Hypothesis 4 is assessed via the net effect of the relative supply-side country 
differences that is captured by the sum of the coefficients (β2 + γs). A positive value of 
the sum favors the above idea of intra-European specialization. For the natural 
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limiting case of complete specialization, we would not find specialization patterns to 
play any role, in which case β2 = γs = 0. In fact, complete specialization is in principle 
compatible with both (new) new theories of trade, based on monopolistic competition 
models of trade as well as Heckscher-Ohlin with trade costs or for substantial 
differences in endowments. However, Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) find evidence 
of similar factor endowments among large parts of our country sample, to potentially 
enable them to produce the same set of goods. Heckscher-Ohlin-based simulation 
results in Haveman and Hummels (2004) with infinitesimally small trade costs 
changing the ordering of minimum cost suppliers without changing prices give rise to 
incomplete specialization in the sense of more than one country in the world 
producing and exporting one particular good to the rest of the world and each supplier 
country supplying a particular good to more than one customer country. On this basis, 
we will identify our limiting case of β2 = γs = 0 as complete specialization based on 
monopolistic competition models of trade, indicating trade in variants of differentiated 
products rather than in different homogenous products.  
We introduce our benchmark results based on specification (23) in the first 
columns of Table 2 and 3 (flows), where we present the estimated coefficients for the 
dependent variables of bilateral parts and components trade introduced in section 4.3. 
Each table contains estimates for a specific variable described earlier that represents 
supply-side country differences: wages (Table 2) and GDP per capita to proxy capital-
labor ratios (Table 3). The results for both types of variables are not materially 
different. The key fact is that our results provide evidence for trade in parts and 
components of capital goods due to the existence of multinational production 
networks across Europe, and inform about the driving forces identified already in the 
first section. 
First, the statistically significant coefficients β1 demonstrate that larger 
countries trade more with each other. Second, the negative coefficients β2 confirm that 
our sample of European countries on average in fact features a rather homogeneous 
specialization pattern in the international production chain as compared to the world 
average. This seems to confirm the results in Kimura et al. (2007) in that European 
trade in parts and components is based on monopolistic competition models of trade, 
indicating trade in variants of differentiated products rather than in different 
homogenous products. However, this average pattern does not reveal the significant 
role for specialization incentives across Europe, as becomes evident when we 
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compare the coefficient β2 with always significantly positive and much larger 
coefficients γs. The sums of the coefficient pairs β2 and γs (β2 + γ1 for the first period 
1992–1995, β2 + γ2 for the second period 1996–1998, etc.) show that relative supply-
side country differences do drive trade in parts and components across Europe. This 
trade is compatible with models of incomplete specialization and trade, but only 
between the original EU-15 and the ten accession countries (EU-10), rather than 
within each of the two country groups. Specifically, when measuring relative supply-
side country differences by wages (Table 2), parts and components trade flows 
between East and West Europe react with an elasticity growing from about 8% (β2 + 
γ1) to some 15% (β2 + γ4). When population-weighted averages are used (Table 4) the 
trade flows react with even larger elasticity growth from about 15% (β2 + γ1) to about 
21% (β2 + γ4). Measuring relative supply-side country differences by per capita GDP 
(Table 3) brings elasticities to a range between 9% and 13%, or 13–16% for results 
accounting for population weights (Table 5). Consequently, bilateral trade flows in 
parts and components between old and new EU members appear to be driven by 
incomplete specialization motives. 
Third, technical progress in terms of declining coordination costs and ongoing 
fragmentation—as captured by the sub-period dummies—appears to positively 
influence trade in parts and components: with the exception of the final sub-period, 
for EU-15/EU-10 pairs, coefficients γs are increasing slowly over time. The slight 
decrease of the γ5 coefficient in the final 2005–2008 sub-period might indicate that 
EU-10 countries catch up with the EU-15 so that supply-side country differences 
between both groups, relative to the world, become less pronounced. This may well 
be affected by the technological progress in the EU-10 countries that is closely linked 
to foreign direct investment and multinationals (Uzagalieva et al., 2012). As foreign-
owned subsidiaries become a part of the innovation systems and the industrial 
structure of the EU-10 countries, they promote overall technological growth in the 
region that further contributes to catch-up with the EU-15. 
Finally, as part of robustness checks (see section 6.2), we plot the confidence 
intervals of the coefficients estimated from specification (23) in Figure 1. Black and 
white bars depict simple and weighted means, respectively. Based on the coefficients’ 
values (vertical axis) and their confidence intervals it is clearly evident that sum of the 
coefficients associated with development of the specialization (β2 + γs) is for all five 
considered periods statistically greater than zero. This property of the coefficients 
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directly implies that specialization patterns of the EU-15 and EU-10 countries were 
complementary during the period under research. 
 
6.2 Robustness 
Tables 2 and 3 already confirm that the relative supply-side country differences that 
generate trade in parts and components across Europe do not depend on the 
measurement of these differences, either as wages or as GDP per capita. 
As already discussed in Debaere (2003), measuring world averages in relative 
supply-side country differences matters a lot. So far, world average wages and GDP 
per capita have been measured as simple averages in the world defined by our full 
reporting sample described in Appendix Table A.1. Tables 4 and 5 display the results 
of a modified world average measurement. We now employ an average that is 
weighted by countries’ populations, as comparable work force data are unavailable on 
the scale of our full sample. The results are not materially different from those 
reported in Tables 2 and 3. Hence, our results are also robust to this change in 
measurement. 
Finally, we complement our robustness results by a statistical comparison of 
the coefficients derived from the estimated specification (23) where wages serve as a 
measure for supply-side country differences. These are coefficients presented in Table 
2 (simple averages) and Table 4 (weighted averages). In Figure 1 we present the plots 
of the confidence intervals of the above coefficients. Black and white bars depict 
simple and weighted means, respectively. The shapes of the white bars reflect the 
lower dispersion due to weighting. The three graphs in Figure 1 show that there is 
ample overlap of the confidence intervals of coefficients. Hence, our results are in a 
statistical sense robust to the world average measurement in terms of simple or 
weighted averages. 
 
6.3 Trade margins and conjectures on links to the offshoring literature 
The results of the previous section provide evidence that the East-West part of the 
European trade in parts and components is driven by trade-offs between location 
advantages and coordination costs, relative to the rest of the world. As Kimura et al. 
(2007) do for East Asia, we take this as evidence for the existence of supply chains in 
the form of international production networks across Europe. While this in itself does 
not constitute evidence for outright offshoring of labor-intensive tasks from West 
24 
 
European to East European firms, we may conclude from the literature cited in section 
2.1 that this is what happens regularly. Accordingly, in this section we will interpret 
trade in parts and components between East and West Europe as being offshore 
related. 
Based on the highly disaggregated nature of our original trade data (see 
Appendix A for data details) we decompose the influences on parts and components 
trade along the two margins of trade, i.e., along extensive (number of exported goods) 
versus intensive (average volumes per exported good) import margins. This reveals 
that trade in parts and components across Europe is predominantly realized along the 
intensive margin in response to market size increases, but along the extensive margin 
in response to stronger relative supply-side country differences, i.e., more offshore-
related trade between the EU-15 and the EU-10 in response to stronger relative 
supply-side country differences may have resulted predominantly from the offshoring 
of new activities rather than extending the scale of already-offshore activities.  
The above results have important implications in terms of wages. According to 
Bergin et al. (2011), recent new offshoring from the EU-15 to the EU-10 may, ceteris 
paribus, have increased employment volatility in the new EU. The margin distinction, 
however, may also be of relevance for wages in the home country. Estimating Mincer-
type wage equations augmented by offshoring treatment effects to firm-level data, 
Geishecker and Görg (2008) demonstrate that offshoring low-skill tasks decreases the 
wages of German low-skill employees. Comparing wage and employment effects 
across countries features significant differences in this respect, which may be 
motivated by different labor market institutions, as suggested in Geishecker et al. 
(2008). 
Our results may be related to an alternative explanation for the internationally 
varying labor-market effects of offshoring, however. Empirical work on the labor-
market effects of offshoring has so far been mainly guided by the theoretical 
framework of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), in which offshoring is costless or 
uniformly costly across discrete sets of tasks, predicting the effects indeed identified 
in Geishecker and Görg (2008). More recent theoretical work, however, generalizes 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) by introducing task-specific trade costs that potentially 
limit the offshoring of a continuum of tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
More offshoring of low-skill tasks, made possible by decreasing coordination costs 
over all tasks, then ceteris paribus implies a positive productivity effect in the source 
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country, which appears strongest in those firms that have already offshored the most, 
and which therefore carries the highest potential benefits for the skill groups hit 
hardest by offshoring. The labor market effects that disadvantage the skill groups hit 
hardest by offshoring, as already identified in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), are thus 
counterbalanced and may even be dominated under certain conditions. Firms that 
have already offshored most tasks are increasingly likely to strengthen already-
existing relationships rather than create new offshoring relationships. In our trade 
terminology, existing offshoring relationships, in turn, get strengthened along the 
intensive margin, as opposed to strengthening along the extensive margin by new 
relationships. One might therefore suspect the unambiguous results of Geishecker and 
Görg (2008) to hold for offshoring relationships that get predominantly strengthened 
along the extensive margin, rather than along the intensive margin. With the caveat of 
our using disaggregated macro rather than micro data, this, in turn, seems to be the 
case for the offshoring relationship between the EU-15 and the EU-10, i.e., the “old” 
and the “new” EU members. In the spirit of the Grosssman Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
approach, this would suggest the conjecture that recent waves of offshoring activities 
from “old” to “new” EU members might have hurt (low-skill) workers in the old EU, 
perhaps more so than old EU offshoring elsewhere. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study started by stating that analyzing gross trade flows in parts and components 
with gravity equations augmented by ad hoc measures of supply-side country 
differences appear to be mis-specified, due to theoretically unmotivated attempts to 
allow for both complete and incomplete specialization influences on parts and 
components trade within the same gravity framework. We develop an appropriate 
gravity framework, rooted in the incomplete-specialization version from Heckscher-
Ohlin, that views bilateral parts and components trade gravity equations as statistical 
relationships constrained on countries’ multilateral specialization patterns and allows 
this trade to increase with fragmentation, declining coordination costs, and 
multilateral incentives to specialization, and also to decline with trade resistance. 
Complete specialization emerges as a natural limiting case with specialization patterns 
playing no role.  
We apply this framework to a truly Europe-wide sample of countries, while 
fully accounting for potential tendencies towards factor price equalization via trade. 
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We find no evidence for the average bilateral European parts and components trade 
relationship to be driven by countries’ multilateral specialization incentives, as 
expressed by relative (to the rest of the world) supply-side country differences. 
However, we do find this evidence for parts and components trade relationships 
between EU-15 and EU-10 countries, together with a positive influence for technical 
progress in terms of declining coordination costs and ongoing fragmentation and a 
negative impact of multilateral trade resistance. Analogous to Kimura et al. (2007)’s 
conclusion on East Asia, we take this as evidence for the existence of international 
production networks across Europe, driven by trade-offs between wages and 
coordination costs. 
In particular, the results do not contradict Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2008), where firms’ decisions about offshoring and trade in parts and components are 
embedded in an environment of incomplete factor price equalization, firm-level 
technologies, and the cost heterogeneity of offshoring across a continuum of tasks, 
and are thus compatible with the view that offshoring need not hurt (low-skill) 
workers, as long as offshoring relationships get strengthened along the intensive 
margin as opposed to the extensive margin. In as much as international production 
networks across Europe are shaped by the outright offshoring of labor-intensive tasks 
from West to East, our results, however, suggest that exactly this strengthening along 
the extensive margin by creating new relationships might have been happening 
recently when extending offshoring from the EU-15 to the EU-10. 
Extensions of this paper may better reflect the influence of declining 
coordination costs, so far proxied by sub-period fixed effects. More realistic attempts 
should aim at measuring trade liberalization or institutional variation especially with 
respect to the labor market (Geishecker et al., 2008).  
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 Table 1. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Source Average, min, max  
EXji,t (PC) Exports of parts and 
components of capital goods 
from country j to country i at 
time t in current dollars 
UN Comtrade Levels:   93,660    0.0    7.12e07 
Logs:       6.36       0.0     18.1 
Extensive 
margin of 
EXji,t (PC) 
Variety of parts and 
components of capital goods 
exported from country j to 
country i at time t  
UN Comtrade, 
own computation 
Levels:    65.1       0.0     629 
Logs:         2.5       0.0     6.4 
Intensive 
margin of 
EXji,t (PC) 
Intensity of parts and 
components exports from 
country j to country i at time 
t  
UN Comtrade, 
own computation 
Levels:    508.3     1.0     1.37e06 
Logs:          3.8      0.0      14.1 
Yj, Yi Export and import, country 
GDP in current dollars  
World 
Development 
Indicators 2011  
Levels:   9.8e05   1172   1.4e07 
 
yj, yi Export and import, country 
GDP per capita in current 
dollars  
World 
Development 
Indicators 2011  
Levels:  20,504     260    93,017 
 
yw World average GDP per 
capita in current dollars  
World 
Development 
Indicators 2011, 
own computation 
Levels:  16,662   10,042   25,566 
 
wj, wi Average wage in 
manufacturing in export and 
import countries in current 
dollars 
LABORSTA, 
ILO database, 
available online 
at 
http://laborsta.ilo
.org/ plus country 
statistical offices 
Levels:  1,272   405   3,561 
 
pi Country population in 
millions 
World 
Development 
Indicators 2011 
Levels:  54.2   0.2   1,354 
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Table 2: Parts and components exports, w=wages (simple world averages) 
   
  Flows Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
log Yj Yi   β1  0.718*** 0.254*** 0.464*** 
      (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|)   β2  -0.101*** -0.040*** -0.061*** 
      (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) 
  1992-1995 γ1  0.183*** 0.104*** 0.079*** 
      (0.036) (0.020) (0.021) 
  1996-1998 γ2  0.202*** 0.117*** 0.085*** 
      (0.036) (0.019) (0.021) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3  0.241*** 0.145*** 0.096*** 
for EU-15 / EU-10 pairs     (0.035) (0.019) (0.020) 
  2002-2004 γ4  0.251*** 0.157*** 0.094*** 
      (0.034) (0.018) (0.020) 
  2005-2008 γ5  0.230*** 0.132*** 0.099*** 
      (0.033) (0.018) (0.020) 
            
N     27,354 27,354 27,354 
Notes to Tables 2–5: Variables are defined in Table 1. Fixed effects not reported, t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Parts and components exports, w=GDP per capita (simple world 
averages) 
   
  Flows Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
log Yj Yi   β1  0.728*** 0.262*** 0.465*** 
      (0.019) (0.011) (0.013) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|)   β2  -0.069*** -0.020 -0.049*** 
      (0.027) (0.014) (0.017) 
  1992-1995 γ1  0.161*** 0.108*** 0.053*** 
      (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) 
  1996-1998 γ2  0.176*** 0.117*** 0.059*** 
      (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3  0.193*** 0.124*** 0.070*** 
for EU-15 / EU-10 pairs     (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) 
  2002-2004 γ4  0.198*** 0.126*** 0.072*** 
      (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) 
  2005-2008 γ5  0.186*** 0.110*** 0.076*** 
      (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) 
            
N     33,034 33,034 33,034 
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Table 4: Parts and components exports, w=wages (population weighted world 
averages) 
   
  Flows Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
log Yj Yi   β1  0.711*** 0.250*** 0.462*** 
      (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|)   
β2  -
0.052*** -0.015*** -0.037*** 
      (0.012) (0.005) (0.011) 
  1992-1995 γ1  0.200*** 0.111*** 0.089*** 
      (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) 
  1996-1998 γ2  0.217*** 0.123*** 0.095*** 
      (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3  0.257*** 0.152*** 0.105*** 
for EU-15 / EU-10 pairs     (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
  2002-2004 γ4  0.260*** 0.161*** 0.100*** 
      (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
  2005-2008 γ5  0.234*** 0.133*** 0.101*** 
      (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) 
            
N     27,354 27,354 27,354 
 
 
Table 5: Parts and components exports, w=GDP per capita (population weighted 
world averages) 
   
 Flows Extensive Margin Intensive Margin 
log Yj Yi   β1 0.712*** 0.256*** 0.456*** 
     (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 
  
β2 
-0.041*** -0.006 -0.035*** 
     (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) 
  1992-1995 γ1 0.172*** 0.112*** 0.060*** 
     (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
  1996-1998 γ2 0.187*** 0.120*** 0.066*** 
     (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) 1999-2001 γ3 0.203*** 0.127*** 0.077*** 
for EU-15 / EU-10 pairs    (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
  2002-2004 γ4 0.207*** 0.129*** 0.078*** 
     (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
  2005-2008 γ5 0.197*** 0.114*** 0.083*** 
     (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
           
N    33,034 33,034 33,034 
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Figure 1. Comparison of confidence intervals for coefficients from specification 
(23) 
 
 
 
Note: Black and white bars depict simple and weighted means, respectively. Confidence intervals are 
labeled in the following way: GDP denotes the coefficient of log Yj Yi (β1) and W denotes the 
coefficient of log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|), where w stands for wages, (β2). The remaining confidence 
intervals refer to the coefficients of log (|wj – ww| × |wi – ww|) for the EU15/10 dummy, computed over 
the specified time periods, i.e., 1992–1995 (γ1), 1996–1998 (γ2), 1999–2001 (γ3), 2002–2004 (γ4), and 
2005–2008 (γ5). 
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Appendix A: Commodity classifications, country, and time coverage 
Commodity classifications 
SITC 
All our trade data are reported according to the Standard International Trade 
Classification, Revision 3 (SITC, Rev.3). Data are used at all aggregation levels (1-
digit-level aggregate trade flows; and 3,114 entries at the 4- and 5-digit levels. We use 
basic categories to distinguish and count SITC categories for the definition of the 
extensive versus intensive margins of trade flows).  
 
BEC 
The United Nations Statistics Division’s Classification by BEC (Broad Economic 
Categories, available online at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/family/family2.asp?Cl=10) 
allows for headings of the SITC, Rev.3 to be grouped into 19 activities covering 
primary and processed foods and beverages, industrial supplies, fuels and lubricants, 
capital goods and transport equipment, and consumer goods according to their 
durability. The BEC also provides for the rearrangement of these 19 activities (on the 
basis of SITC categories’ main end-use) to approximate the basic System of National 
Accounts (SNA) activities, namely, primary goods, intermediate goods, capital goods, 
and consumer goods. 
Specifically, the BEC permits the identification of a subset of about 300 
intermediate goods used as inputs for capital goods, i.e. parts and accessories of 
capital goods. In this paper, consistent with the use in the rest of the literature, these 
are referred to as parts and components. 
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Table A.1 Import-reporting countries, country codes, and trade data availability 
1 AUT Austria (1992–2008)   9 FRA France (1992–2008) 17 LVA Latvia (1995–2008) 
2 BEL Belgium and Luxembourg (1992–
2008)  
10 GBR United Kingdom (1992–2008) 18 NLD Netherlands (1992–2007) 
3 BGR Bulgaria (1996–2008) 11 GER Germany (1992–2008) 19 POL Poland (1992–2008) 
4 CZE Czech Republic (1993–2008) 12 GRC Greece (1992–2008) 20 PRT Portugal (1992–2008) 
5 DNK Denmark (1992–2008) 13 HUN Hungary (1992–2008) 21 ROM Romania (1992–2008) 
6 ESP Spain (1992–2008) 14 IRL Ireland (1992–2008) 22 SVK Slovakia (1993–2008) 
7 EST Estonia (1995–2008) 15 ITA Italy (1992–2008) 23 SVN Slovenia (1995–2008) 
8 FIN Finland (1992–2008) 16 LTU Lithuania (1995–2008) 24 SWE Sweden (1992–2008) 
         
Note: Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one country. EU-15 underlined; EU-10 in italics. Each reporting country’s import data are given for all reporter countries for 
the indicated time period. For the computation of our world averages the “world” constitutes the EU countries in the table plus the following countries: Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Canada, Switzerland, Cyprus, Georgia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Macedonia, Malta, Norway, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, the U.S., China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Hence, the “world” encompasses 54 
countries that on average account for more than 90 percent of reported imports. 
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